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For today, more may depend on human freedom than 
ever before – on man’s capacity to turn the scales 
which are heavily weighted in favour of disaster 
which always happens automatically and therefore 
always appears to be irresistible. No less than the 
continued existence of mankind on earth may depend 
this time upon man’s gift to ‘perform miracles’, 
that is, to bring about the infinitely improbable and 
establish it as a reality.  
Hannah Arendt (1960: 45)
Notwithstanding the alarm bells that accompany 
the use of the word ‘man’ as synonymous with 
human being, Arendt’s observations above ring 
unexpectedly true today, in the midst of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, limited by the dire necessity 
of staying alive on a global scale, all too aware 
of the seemingly insurmountable injustices 
it has brought into focus. This adherence to 
necessity, to the automatic unfolding of cause 
and effect, is the opposite of what Hannah Arendt 
conceives to be human freedom. For Arendt, 
freedom is the distinctly human capacity to 
‘break into the world wholly unexpected and 
unforeseen’ (43) and to begin something new 
without full knowledge of or control over its 
consequences, but with the possibility of shifting 
the scales. And this very ability to interrupt what 
appears to be inescapable is as miraculous as it 
is commonplace.
The lonesome image of Greta Thunberg holding 
her banner on her first Skolstrejk för Klimatet 
(school strike for the climate) comes to mind. 
In the first instance, Thunberg’s school strike is 
a personal action publicly made, a small-scale 
but visible deed. It purposefully breaks the school 
routine to bring about a more substantial break 
and, indeed, to create a world where school 
routines can last. Unbeknownst to Thunberg at 
the time, her singular act of resistance begins 
a movement of collective activism on a global 
scale, allowing her contemporaries not only to 
witness but also to partake in the performance 
of freedom and its spectacular resonance. While 
organizers of a recent conference on theatre 
pedagogy might suggest, tongue-in-cheek, that it 
is unlikely for Thunberg ‘to embark on a program 
of actor training’ (Alexandrowicz and Fancy 
2019), I beg to differ and I suspect Arendt would 
agree with me. Given her emphasis on freedom 
as public performance and her recognition of the 
affinity between politics and the theatre, Arendt 
would encourage critically engaged citizens to 
undertake performer training in order to develop 
precisely the skills to enact their freedom and to 
perform everyday miracles.
This article offers a close reading of Arendt’s 
understanding of freedom and political action 
to propose a performer training utopia that 
identifies itself as a series of exercises of/for 
freedom. Steering clear of training models that 
are presented as ‘freeing’ a performer’s body or 
voice (incisively criticized by Sjöström 2015), 
I focus my attention on solo performance 
and on the relationship between performer 
and spectators. How does one train as a solo 
performer to make an appearance in front of 
others in a way that brings about the experience 
of freedom for all? What skills does one need 
to publicly do something ‘wholly unexpected 
and unforeseen’? The solo genre resonates with 
Arendt’s description of freedom as an event, but 
it also brings up specific challenges – particularly 
with respect to the neoliberalist celebration of 
a different kind of individual freedom and its 
influences on solo performance as a paradigm. 
Touching briefly upon solo documentary 
performance and solo autobiographical 
performance to identify key dynamics regarding 
the performer’s relationship with spectators, 
I turn my attention towards clowning. 
I investigate specific clown training practices 
(including examples of ensemble training that 
provide space for solo emergence, which I read as 
clown training techniques) and discuss how they 
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exercise – that is, rehearse, practise, educate, keep 
working – freedom in action.
F R E E D O M
Arendt takes issue with modern philosophical 
approaches that confine freedom to a mental 
process. Paradoxically, inner freedom is equated 
with doing whatever one wants, on the one hand, 
and with the very faculty with which one controls 
one’s desires, on the other (Arendt 1961: 146–8). 
Actor training models that profess freedom often 
bear the same aporia: to become freer the actor 
is asked to control – to exercise sovereignty over 
– her automatic responses; yet this is all done 
in search of what is deemed to be a deeper and 
more authentic set of automatic responses (see 
Evans 2009: 154–61). Arendt’s freedom hinges on 
a person’s agency to take action; it requires the 
presence of others and a tangible shared world 
in which to act and to be perceived while doing 
so. Critiquing the solitary and apolitical nature 
of inner freedom, Arendt asserts the primacy 
of political freedom: ‘We first become aware of 
freedom or its opposite in our intercourse with 
others, not in the intercourse with ourselves’ 
(1961: 148).
Freedom and political action are inextricably 
linked. Setting the stage for the experience of 
freedom is the sole purpose of politics: ‘The 
raison d’être of politics is freedom, and its field of 
experience is action’ (146). Arendt references the 
public sphere of the ancient city-state, polis, where 
citizens communicate who they are with words 
and deeds, as the political space par excellence. 
She distinguishes between the private realm 
(which includes the social), where negotiations 
around necessities, such as sustenance and its fair 
sharing, are made, from the political sphere where, 
unfettered by necessity, human beings can shape 
and change the world on a historical level. While 
Arendt has been criticized for overlooking the 
injustices of the polis – its use of slave labour and 
exclusion of women and foreigners – it serves as 
a model for an Arendtian understanding of politics 
that aims first and foremost ‘to establish and keep 
in existence a space where freedom as virtuosity 
can appear’ (Arendt 1960: 35).
Political action in this respect is a distinct 
type of activity. Different from labour, which 
enslaves human beings in a constant cycle of 
production and consumption, and work, which 
has meaning insofar as its fruits are lasting and 
effective, action is an end-in-itself. It is not 
measured according to the extent to which it 
achieves an aim, but by its very existence, its 
performative virtuosity and its ability to resonate 
among its witnesses. Paul Voice uses the verbs 
‘individuating and disclosing’ (2014: 89) to define 
it and Svetlana Boym refers to it as a theatrical 
adventure that is both a response to the world 
as it is and an invitation to cocreate or imagine 
a different world: ‘The experience of freedom 
is akin to the theatrical performance that uses 
conventions, public memory, and a common 
stage but also allows for the possibility of the 
unprecedented and the particular’ (2010: 4). 
Freedom takes place as a heroic political action 
unfolds, performatively and spontaneously, in 
front of others. It reveals something about the 
world and provokes a response.
Returning to Thunberg, it might be argued 
that her school strike falls under the category 
of work as opposed to action as it states 
a very clear environmentalist aim. In fact, 
Thunberg might argue that the school strike 
is entirely instrumental and worthless unless 
it manages to change policy. Yet, regardless 
of how effectively Thunberg sets in motion 
a reversal of environmental damage, her action 
can be recognized and indeed celebrated as an 
experience of freedom in the Arendtian sense. 
Voice writes that a key quality of political action 
as theatrical freedom is the ability to create 
deliberative processes, to engage communities 
in debate, to practise persuasion, argumentation 
and negotiation, and to cultivate a participatory 
democracy that allows for ‘messy dialogue’ 
(2014: 94). An individual discloses herself – in 
this case, Thunberg shares her panic at the end of 
the world and her rage that adults in charge are 
not acting upon the scientific information – and 
ripples of conversations and actions are triggered. 
It is not only those who take to the streets or 
join the school strike who exercise their freedom 
in this case; it is also all others who witness the 
performance of a child illuminated on a global 
scale. A shared space emerges around her action; 
those who witness it become part of the same 
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space, the same (doomed) globe.
The theatrical performance of political action 
has a unique way of creating space, even where no 
such public realm exists. This is due to the 
inherent relationality of political action, as Arendt 
explains: ‘Action … no matter what its specific 
content, always establishes relationships and 
therefore has an inherent tendency to force open 
limitations and cut across all boundaries’ 
(1958: 190). In her Arendtian analysis of the 
artistic practices of the Umbrella movement 
during widespread protests in Hong Kong, 
Laikwan Pang focuses on their ability ‘to 
transform non-places into social and political 
spaces’ (2016: 158). This capacity to create space 
goes in tandem with a capacity to transform an 
anonymous mass into a public. In the throes of 
a totalitarian and/or neoliberal establishment that 
co-opts anti-establishment actions, the event of 
freedom creates relationships between actors and 
spectators, and among the spectators themselves, 
and thus changes the faceless multitude into 
many singularities, at the same time and place, 
witnessing the unfolding of the same action.
Thunberg’s action also creates its own stage 
and audience; furthermore, it projects into the 
future. While it might appear that it is Thunberg 
who is exercising her freedom, her immediate and 
future witnesses partake in the event of freedom 
as much as, if not more than, the doer herself. 
Freedom in action is never fully accessible to the 
one who performs it, but ‘reveals itself fully only 
to the storyteller, that is, to the backward glance 
of the historian’ (Arendt 1958: 192). For Arendt, 
the self-revelatory quality of action, ‘its implicit 
manifestation of the agent and the speaker’ (187) 
and its virtuosic embodiment of an ‘inspiring 
principle’ (1961: 33) require others to take note 
and to understand. While the agent’s willingness 
to take action may be how freedom begins, it 
nevertheless continues more strongly in the 
witnesses who are able to see the full picture.
S O L O  P E R F O R M A N C E
Arendt’s elaboration on the spectator’s 
experience of freedom resonates with utopian 
readings of solo performance. Jill Dolan’s coinage 
of the utopian performative draws specifically 
on this genre’s unique ability to bring about 
a collective experience. Citing the multi-character 
work of Anna Deavere Smith and focusing on 
the intersubjectivity of spectatorship, Dolan 
observes how one performer embodying many 
characters invites spectators to partake in a sense 
of hope. The solo performer models a practice 
of occupying the shoes of another, provoking 
spectators to take a flight of the imagination 
towards the possibility of political dialogue 
across differences (2002). She becomes a vehicle 
for spectators to envision themselves speaking 
the words of others in their own names and to 
acknowledge the arbitrariness of such differences, 
that their lives could have indeed turned 
out differently.
Solo performance can thus bring about 
a tangible experience of plurality. Yet it can also 
solicit an affirmation of singularity, specifically 
in the case of marginalized identities that make 
space for themselves in solo autobiographical 
performance. José Esteban Muñoz begins 
Disidentifications with the image of Marga Gomez, 
whose solo performance, he observes, ‘permits the 
spectator, often a queer who has been locked out 
of the halls of representation or rendered a static 
caricature there, to imagine a world where queer 
lives, politics, and possibilities are representable 
in their complexity’ (1999: 1). In this example, 
solo performance becomes a vehicle for non-
heteronormative stories to resist the hegemonic 
discourse. But the resistance echoes beyond 
the performer. The solo act invites the many 
spectators to say, ‘Me too!’; it ceases to belong 
solely to the person performing but by virtue of 
the fact that it is public, incites a collective sense 
of agency.
Resonating with Muñoz’s reading of Gomez, 
one of Pang’s case studies involves ‘the 
transmutation of a solo dance to a collective 
dance’ (2016: 168). Renowned dancer Mui Cheuk-
yin offers the basic steps and overall shape of 
her solo piece Eulogy, which uses an umbrella as 
a partner for the dancer, as a starting point for 
‘Umbrella Dance’, inviting others to collectively 
occupy a form she has created in solitude. While 
the open-endedness, unpredictability, natality 
and plurality of this shift from the solo Eulogy to 
the ensemble ‘Umbrella Dance’ resonate strongly 
with Arendt, for Pang it is the active attention 
of watching that brings about the experience 
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of freedom for all. This time, paradoxically, the 
occupants are transformed ‘from political actors 
into artistic spectators … given the chance to 
see themselves as players on this historical 
stage, realigning seeing and acting and also 
transcending their own political position’ (168).
While its ‘relative low cost, accessibility 
unfettered by industry gatekeepers, and 
willingness to treat the personal as the political’ 
renders solo performance ‘of particular 
significance to marginalised communities’, 
Stephen Greer is sceptical that the form is 
‘inherently or unreservedly empowering for 
politicised subjects’ (2019: 6–7). Foregrounding 
autobiography, as Greer critically articulates, also 
materializes the neoliberal ideal of freedom in 
the figure of the individual entrepreneur. Lazlo 
Pearlman also problematizes the notions of 
authenticity and self-revelation that permeate the 
discourse on solo, and critiques ‘expectations and 
requirements of autobiographical “truth-telling” 
in identity-based theatre’ (2015: 88). Offering 
a Foucauldian approach, he identifies how the 
revelation of one’s ‘truth’ operates as a form of 
coercion, rehearsing an internalized disciplinary 
voice under the guise of liberation. He proposes 
‘to queer the machinery of confession’ using 
‘dissemblage’, a method of decentring truth, and 
an alternative to truth-worship (89).
While solo autobiographical performance 
co-opted by the pervasive neoliberalist agenda 
can veer towards problematic self-narratives, 
it is important to note that Arendt’s political 
agent is not in charge of what they reveal. On 
the contrary, ‘nobody knows whom he reveals 
when he discloses himself in deed or word’ but 
‘must be willing to risk the disclosure’ (1958: 180). 
Save for the fact that they respond to the world 
in a way that is there for all to see, save for that 
momentary display of courage that makes them 
step into the public square, the hero is not heroic 
at all (186).
The significance and risk attached to simply 
taking action publicly and revealing oneself is 
evident in Thunberg’s case. As a child, she is 
conventionally excluded from the political sphere, 
which aligns her more closely with Arendtian 
freedom. Analysing Arendt’s writings on Socrates 
(Arendt and Kohn 2005) and Billy Budd (Arendt 
1963, 1969), the eponymous hero of Melville’s 
novella Billy Budd, Sailor (1967), Munia Bhaumik 
traces a recurrent staging of the non-citizen as 
a way of emphasizing the significance of the 
witnesses to the event of freedom. ‘Her frequent 
recuperation of the speechless hero posits an 
ethics of reading for the imperceptible as an 
obligation of democratic life’ (2015: 29). Bhaumik 
argues that Arendt focuses on these cast-away 
heroes in order to underline the value of plurality 
as opposed to singularity and to critique regimes 
that work towards readily accepted and roughly 
copy–pasted opinions. Arendt thus casts the 
‘figure of an ethical witness who questions 
rather than consents’ (28) and she ‘insist[s] 
upon the spectator’s obligations to the silenced 
figure’ (27). Returning to the example of solo 
autobiographical performance by representatives 
of marginalized communities, it follows that the 
spectators’ engagement and experience of the 
performative event as a celebration of difference 
assigns them an ethical responsibility to carry 
outside the theatre. This reciprocation is more 
significant than the truth (or not) of what is 
revealed by the performer.
C L O W N
The figure of the speechless hero as silenced 
other resonates strongly with clown. Clown origin 
stories in recent publications are rife with images 
of misfits: Nalle Laanela describes everyone 
laughing while he is ‘trying to be serious about 
being a dancer’ (Laanela and Sacks 2015: 6) 
and David Carlyon recounts trading basic army 
training (as a conscientious objector) with Clown 
College (2016: 3). In both examples, the authors 
one day discover that what they do is clowning 
and decide to embrace this path. While clown 
training manuals, practitioners’ interviews and 
writings, and scholarly research share a tendency 
to talk about the clown as a type of being qualified 
by adjectives such as ‘innocent’, ‘mischievous’ or 
‘failure-prone’, as clown and pedagogue Avner 
Eisenberg explains, clown is ‘a verb … There’s 
no such thing as a clown. There’s only to clown’ 
(quoted in LeBank and Bridel 2015: 64). Like 
Arendt’s freedom, clowning is emergent and 
intricately connected to public action.
What actions constitute clowning? For 
Eisenberg (2016), to clown means to come 
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across interesting problems and solve them 
in interesting ways. The emphasis here is not 
on the content (so the problem or solution is 
not necessarily interesting in isolation) but on 
the attitude: to clown means to encounter the 
world with fascination and a sense of novelty. 
This resonates strongly with the notion of 
natality that Arendt identifies as a key aspect of 
freedom. Human beings begin things and take 
actions that set in motion events that cannot be 
contained. Human beings shift perspectives and 
invent possibilities, enacting ‘the freedom to call 
something into being which did not exist before, 
which was not given, not even as an object of 
cognition or imagination, and which therefore 
strictly speaking could not be known’ (Arendt 
1961: 32). A clown’s adventures in the world bring 
about newness and unpredictability, as well as 
a commitment to accepting and playing with 
unknowable consequences.
In Core Training for the Relational Actor, 
Alison Hodge shares an exercise she calls 
‘Re-configuring the Body’. Albeit not a clown 
exercise in its original context, this practice 
invites performers (including myself) to 
‘play with the space between their body and 
a vertical stick’ in recognition of the fact that 
we ‘approach “things” within our immediate 
environment not as fixed, known objects but 
as entities to be discovered through contact’ 
(Hodge 2013: 35, 34; see also the DVD section 
titled ‘With Things’). It is impossible to receive 
impulses from an inanimate immobile object, 
yet playing with the space in between, the 
performer discovers a sense of relationality. 
In each encounter, the weight, volume, shape, 
temperature and texture of the stick are met 
anew. And when the performer begins to play 
with the movement patterns inherent to the 
stick, submitting to or resisting its tendency to 
crash and fall or its unbending shape, a clown 
attitude emerges. A common object like a stick 
(or an umbrella) becomes an interlocutor, a co-
creator and an opportunity to conjure a new 
world, capturing a trace of the natality inherent 
in Arendtian freedom.
Positing clown training as a type of critical 
pedagogy after Freire, Laurel Butler also talks of 
‘re-approaching reality’ (2012: 70). Her pedagogic 
practice is rooted in the idea that anybody can be 
trained to come upon the everyday as if it were 
new. She works with walking, gradually drawing 
students’ attention to different elements of this 
pedestrian movement to find estrangement 
and novelty, what I would see as a kind of 
Brechtian verfremdung. While I am critical of 
the essentializing discourse on finding one’s 
clown or becoming clown as if it exists as a new 
other person within oneself, I agree that clown 
exercises share an ability to bring about a shift 
in perspective. Both the encounter with the stick 
and the work on walking cultivate a willingness 
and joy in the performer to look for other ways of 
doing things and to actively enact a ‘clown’ logic.
It is politically significant that this search is 
carried out in solidarity with others. Clowning, 
like the improvisatory performance of freedom, 
shares the actor’s spontaneous process with 
spectators and this synchronicity is precisely 
what brings about the experience of freedom 
for all. Another response to the accusation that 
Arendt engages in hero-worship is to point out 
her emphasis that the political actor, like the 
clown, does not know how everything will pan 
out. While all artistic creativity has an element 
of surprise, Arendt notes that the creative 
process, what she sees as the truly free period 
of virtuosity in the arts, is mostly hidden from 
the public (1961: 34). Performative forms such as 
clown, on the other hand, hinge specifically on 
the transparency, humility and spontaneity of 
the actor, who is not a hero ready to impress the 
audience with their virtue, but rather one of those 
spectators who cannot help but take action and 
face the consequences.
While definitions of clown as the revelation 
of an inner authentic self might profess some 
affinity with the self-revelatory aspect of 
Arendtian freedom, the training process leading 
up to finding ‘one’s clown’ cannot be assumed 
as liberating. Echoing Pearlman’s critique of 
truth-telling in solo performance, Purcell Gates 
identifies a tension between the discourse of 
authenticity that underlies the French clown 
training tradition and the kind of subjectivity 
that arrives in the training: an in-between-self 
as opposed to a very-much-itself-self. Purcell 
Gates, like Pearlman, shows how pervasive 
the notion of an inner authentic self can be: 
‘students nevertheless tended to link the idea of 
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successfully following an impulse on stage in the 
midst of disorientation with being in touch with 
the “self”’ (2011: 237).
Paradoxically, Purcell Gates suggests, what 
appears to come from within indeed comes 
from without, from the clown’s relationship 
with the world and others. What emerges is ‘a 
self that was negotiated externally, in the space 
between the performer and spectator, as the 
performer’s body signified a self that caused the 
spectator to respond with laughter, even as the 
performer was unaware of this communication’ 
(241). Purcell Gates’s conclusion echoes Arendt’s 
assertion that political action (and the event of 
freedom) is available to spectators who are able 
to see the full image, rather than the political 
actors themselves.
It is not surprising, then, that Eisenberg (2016) 
begins his clown pedagogy by working on the 
space between persons using the breath. The 
breath marks the relationality of clowning in 
two ways: first, it is a tangible expression of the 
clown’s relationship with the audience. Alison 
Hodge observes that ‘breath is intricately bound 
to feeling – it can suppress or release feelings in 
equal measure’ (2013: 32). This somatic aspect 
of the breath can be shared physically between 
an actor and spectators, affording a materiality 
to the experience of being ‘with neither for nor 
against others’ (Arendt 1958: 180). The clown 
walks in, gasps and holds their breath and the 
audience follows suit; they reciprocate the 
performer’s breath and the implicit feeling. 
Eisenberg (2016) refers to this moment as the 
terror that the clown and the spectators share: ‘is 
it going to be awful?’ The moment the performer 
relaxes and exhales, so does the audience. Fear 
is overcome and a willingness to play takes hold. 
Courage, the primary virtue of the clown and the 
Arendtian actor, is enacted.
For Eisenberg too, it is fundamental that the 
clown’s process of coming upon and solving 
problems is shared with spectators. Indeed, 
to clown is to submit to a wholly relational 
existence in an unpredictable world, where ‘every 
action is either a reaction to something else or 
so that something else can be done’ (2016). In 
his workshop Making the Audience Feel Things: 
A discourse on clowning, Eisenberg works with 
a participant through the impossible (and 
imaginary) task of keeping a valuable paper bag 
dry while putting on a raincoat and opening an 
umbrella in a downpour. In their first attempt, 
the performer does a great job of acrobatically 
indicating how they would achieve this feat. 
Yet what Eisenberg is after is something much 
simpler and yet much more challenging: to do 
one thing at a time, always sharing with the 
audience and keeping the cause or the aim of 
each action transparent. It doesn’t matter if the 
solutions are ingenious; the aim here is to create 
a shared space where they occur to the performer 
at the same time as they occur to the spectators.
Working with the breath sustains the 
connection with the spectators and enables the 
actor to stay in this wholly relational, wholly 
processual mode of being where they do one 
thing at a time, always with the spectators. Every 
action is accompanied by a breath, an inhale or 
an exhale. Whether the actor playfully interrupts 
and punctuates the automatic flow of breath 
or they observe and allow its pattern, following 
the breath in this way brings the actor and the 
spectators somatically to the same time and 
space, creates an affinity with unpredictability 
and encourages everyone to note (and play with) 
what is and isn’t controllable.
The co-existence of performer and spectator 
extends beyond the visceral into the ethical, and 
indeed the political. For Arendt, it is crucial for 
the one taking action to understand the values 
of a community and find a sense of togetherness 
‘with others and neither for nor against them’ 
(1958: 180). A political action embodies a shared, 
recognizable virtue, in a way that can be seen 
and identified by everyone. The Arendtian actor 
performs in a way that is crystal clear and visible; 
it calls others to attention and brings otherwise 
unconnected individuals into a shared experience 
with its ‘shining brightness we once called glory’ 
(ibid.). The red nose (often read as a liberating 
agent in the process of becoming clown) operates 
as a marker of shared space. In a relational 
reading of clown, the nose does not so much 
permit the actor to become someone else, but 
shines a light on the stage, invites the spectators 
to partake in the spectacle, and connotes with its 
‘shining brightness’ that something different is 
happening. Taking the stage this way requires an 
acute awareness of the audience, an embodied 
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expressivity of clear and transparent actions and 
communicative skills to generate deliberative 
processes, further words and deeds.
Eisenberg explains how the virtuosity of 
clown is different from the virtuosity of any 
other circus performer precisely due to this 
in-betweenness. He traces the red nose to the 
sign of drunkenness and loss of inhibition, 
yet rather than essentializing how it affects 
the performer, he discusses how it functions 
as a psychological mediator that ensures an 
emotional connectivity between the spectators 
and what they are witnessing. Co-feeling is at 
the core here: Eisenberg tells the story of an 
average person who walks onto the circus arena 
and jumps on a horse or climbs the tightrope. 
Just as the Arendtian actor demonstrates courage 
and spontaneity, a ‘willingness to act and speak 
at all’ (186), so does this ‘Uncle Louis’ who 
shows courage to break into the circle and yet 
acts as ‘one of us … an intermediary between 
the virtuosos of the circus and the ordinary 
human beings’ (Eisenberg 2016). The nose’s 
permissiveness extends (an invitation) from the 
performer to the spectators.
E X E R C I S I N G  F R E E D O M
The discussion above returns repeatedly to the 
relationality of the clown/the Arendtian actor, 
which places them alongside and among their 
spectators. The event of freedom is emergent 
through this togetherness; it is not the person 
who is free, courageous or glorious who takes 
action, but rather the one who takes action 
performs and embodies these characteristics. 
Following this logic, it should come as no surprise 
that exercising freedom is not a solo endeavour 
but an ensemble practice. In conclusion, I wish 
to put forth a specific ensemble exercise that 
echoes an Arendtian political model by placing 
the individual actor in front of a group of 
active spectators, as an exercise for/of freedom 
implicitly bringing about the emergence of clowns 
and political actors. The example I will discuss 
can be placed among other similar practices, such 
as Iben Nagel Rasmussen’s ‘Wind Dance’ (Magnat 
2013: 108–10) and the Viewpoints’ ‘Lane Work’ 
(Bogart and Landau 2005: 68–70). These share 
a simple format: they use a set of constraints and 
instructions to first establish an ensemble, and 
then allow a soloist to step out and engage in 
a call and response with the others before joining 
them again. Performers take turns to be this 
separate individual and the work is wrapped up 
when everyone has had a chance.
In this exercise I will call ‘Counter-rhythm’, 
participants form a circle facing one another, 
while stepping in and out and breathing together 
at a common tempo-rhythm. (This specific form 
has not been documented but it is a continuation 
and variation of ‘Tempo-Rhythm’ and ‘Polyphonic 
Attention’ in Hodge 2007, 2013.) The tempo-
rhythm is most commonly a 4/4 beat, with 
the right or the left foot moving in and out of 
the circle while the other foot steps in place, 
and a vocal emphasis on 1 accompanied by 
a step into the circle and a jubilant, ‘Huh!’ The 
ensemble discovers, negotiates and works to 
keep the rhythm together by mediating between 
individual tendencies to speed up or slow down. 
It gets boring, tiring, dull, exhausting, confusing 
and even oppressive. The group continues. The 
participants keep meeting one another on the 
beat, with eyes, bodies and voices working to 
synchronize and to observe. Keeping a steady 
beat going itself becomes a playful effort – one 
where participants have to consider giving and 
receiving energy or impulses through the breath 
and the movement.
Although the task of establishing and 
sustaining a shared rhythm is a political challenge 
in itself, the crux of the exercise happens when 
an individual performer steps into the middle and 
makes an appearance. Continuing the action of 
stepping but allowing it to permeate the whole 
body, all the while listening to the continuous 
rhythmic drone of the circle, the soloist in the 
middle begins to play. They move, dance, alter 
the shape and tempo-rhythm of the breathing 
and the stepping as they gradually embody 
a counter-rhythm in the feet and the breath, 
a little melodic overlay on top of the steadiness 
of the beat. If the tempo-rhythm of the circle is 
a 4/4 with an emphasis on the 1, the soloist in the 
middle can play with 2/4 or 8/8, 3/4 or 9/8, place 
the emphasis off-beat or combine different beats. 
They can speed up, slow down, drag certain beats 
and rush through others. They can move back and 
forth between fitting the circle’s tempo-rhythm 
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and offering a counter-rhythm; indeed, they can 
go fully into an arhythmic territory. They can 
actively confuse or put off the circle; however, 
an antagonistic relationship with the circle often 
results in short-lived experiments that degenerate 
and break the jointly created space and finish the 
exercise for all.
The performer in the middle continues to 
move as they listen and respond: there is no 
separate space to settle upon a solo rhythm 
– rather it emerges in dialogue between the 
individual performer in the middle and the 
ensemble circle. As the soloist listens and begins 
to differ, the collaborative effort to maintain 
a creative tension and a dialogic relationship 
brings about an experience of novelty and 
fascination for all. The interaction with the 
soloist in turn animates the circle: the ensemble 
has a reason to sustain the steady tempo-
rhythm, as the more certain the beat, the more 
power and resource it gives the soloist to play. 
The circle creates a trampoline for the one in 
the middle with the quality of their attention, 
breathing and stepping; as active spectators 
they will the person in the middle to perform 
something incredible, virtuosic and miraculous. 
The overall shape of the practice thus echoes 
Arendt’s description of freedom; it brings about 
a disruption of the habitual with the appearance 
of something unexpected and cultivates an 
affinity with and a pleasure of the kinds of 
qualities that constitute Arendt’s freedom 
as virtuosity: courage, natality, spontaneity, 
responsiveness, visibility and willingness to 
make an appearance.
This article proposed clown training as 
an exercise of/for freedom and put forth 
an understanding of clown as a relational, 
unpredictable, uncontainable and novel way of 
acting relationally and spontaneously. There 
are fascinating examples of clowns in activist 
performance, such as the work of Clandestine 
Insurgent Rebel Clown Army (CIRCA), which 
I haven’t considered here. Instead, I analysed 
Arendtian freedom in order to extract specific 
qualities that can be nurtured in performer 
training, specifically clown training. The utopia 
here is that clown training can prepare the 
performer to take action and exercise their 
freedom inside and outside the theatre, as an 
active citizen in the public space, in ways that 
may or may not be overtly political. Clown 
training can equip the performer with the skills to 
make their appearance and respond to the world 
in unexpected ways, thereby revealing something 
about the world.
Furthermore, ensemble practices that create 
a space for solo emergence can be understood 
as exercises for/of freedom, as they invite 
participants to create a shared space in which 
individuals can experiment with action, 
difference, separating themselves from others 
and beginning something new. Embedded in 
such ensemble activities is a unique sense of 
collaboration in search of moments of exquisite 
particularity within a structure of repetition, 
comparable to what Arendt might see as the 
everyday miracle of freedom. Moving away from 
paradigms of ‘clown as inner self’ towards clown 
as a mode of relationality, the training utopia 
proposed here educates a sense of ease with being 
with others and the courage to be different from 
others. Arendtian freedom rests on an image of 
a co-created world in which political action is 
possible for all.
When Arendt states ‘theatre is the political art 
par excellence; only there is the political sphere 
of human life transposed into art’ (1958: 188), she 
points out how the relational, self-revelatory and 
impromptu nature of human action is present in 
the theatre. The practices discussed above capture 
the ebb and flow of a utopian active political life 
where one goes back and forth between being 
one of many, who create the space by the quality 
of their attention and their responsiveness/
responsibility as witnesses, and being the one 
who steps out and in and exercises their freedom. 
Verbs Arendt uses to describe freedom, such as 
‘disclosing one’s self without ever either knowing 
[oneself] or being able to calculate beforehand 
what [one] reveals’ (192), ‘inserting [oneself] 
into the human world through action and 
speech’ (184), ‘express[ing] this distinction and 
distinguish[ing] [one]self’ (176) and ‘begin[ning] 
a story of one’s own’ (186), are stage directions 
or instructions for this improvisation. They are 
also invitations to experience and express oneself 
in a singular act, with full awareness that, as 
Rebecca Schneider puts is, ‘the successful solo 
is no solo at all’, but always already ‘a map of 
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citations and a subjectivity so multiply connected 
as to be collective’ (2005: 38, 36). We are all Greta 
Thunbergs after all, waiting for our turn to step 
into the circle. Had Thunberg not taken action 
and gone on strike, someone else would have 
done something else equally as powerful. Another 
clown, displaying ‘a combination of play and duty, 
an obligation and a potential for creative civic 
action’ (Boym 2010: 13–14) would have emerged.
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